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ABSTRACT 
The few systematic international comparisons of climate policy strength made so far have 
serious weaknesses, particularly those that assign arbitrary weightings to different policy 
instrument types in order to calculate an aggregate score for policy strength. This article avoids 
these problems by ranking the six biggest emitters by far - China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, 
and Japan - on a set of six key policy instruments that are individually potent and together 
representative of climate policy as a whole. The results for 2013 are as follows: 
Carbon taxes:    EU/Japan  
Emissions trading:   EU; Japan/China; US. 
Feed-in tariffs:   Japan; EU/India; China; US 
Quotas:    US/India; EU 
Fossil fuel power plant bans:  China; US; EU 
Vehicle emissions standards:  EU/Japan; China/US 
This dispels any idea that there is a clear hierarchy on climate policy with Europe at the top: the 
EU does lead on a number of policies but so does Japan. China, the US, and India each lead on 
one area.  Russia is inactive on all fronts. At the same time climate policy everywhere remains 
weak compared to what it could be. 
 
POLICY RELEVANCE 
The policy relevance of the study is that it enables climate policy strength, defined as the extent 
to which the statutory provisions of climate policies are likely to restrict greenhouse gas 
emissions if implemented as intended, to be assessed and compared more realistically across 
space and time. As such its availability for the six biggest emitters, which together account for 
over 70% of global CO2 emissions, should facilitate international negotiations (1) by giving 
participants a better idea of where major emitters stand relative to the each other as far as climate 
policy stringency is concerned, and (2) by identifying areas of weakness that need action. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International climate negotiations are largely about who should do what in terms of reducing 
emissions. Knowing who does what now, and how it compares with others, is therefore 
knowledge worth having. We may have impressions about where climate policies are strongest 
but things are changing rapidly and we have no precise measure. Trends in emissions are not 
always reliable as a measure of climate policy strength because they are also affected by factors 
such as economic performance. Emissions targets are untrustworthy because it is hard to identify 
how far they represent deviations from business as usual emissions and because they do not 
guarantee that substantive policies will be introduced, much less whether targets will be 
achieved. Comparing complete sets of climate policies is problematic because the policies that 
can be classified as climate policies are so numerous and varied. 
Comparing across countries and regions therefore requires identification of a subset of climate 
policies that can be used as an indicator of the strength of each polity’s climate policy as a 
whole. According to the OECD, an indicator can be defined as: 
A quantitative or a qualitative measure derived from a series of observed facts that can 
reveal relative positions (e.g. of a country) in a given area. When evaluated at regular 
intervals, an indicator can point out the direction of change across different units and 
through time (OECD, 2008, p. 13).  
Comparisons of climate policies are numerous but few focus specifically on comparing their 
stringency (see, for example, Dubash et al, 2013).  The few that do this start with a carefully 
chosen set of individual climate policy types, assign precise numbers to each of these on the 
basis of a quantitative scale of stringency based either on direct measures (such as taxes on 
energy as a percentage of energy prices) or expert assessments of stringency, and obtain a 
summary score for climate policy strength by transforming scores into a common metric where 
necessary, weighting each individual score according to an assessment of its importance to 
climate policy, then averaging them or adding them together (Kuenkel, Jacob and Busch, 2006; 
Germanwatch, 2011, 2012; Steves and Teytelboym, 2013). The result is misleading precision 
and questionable validity as a measure of climate policy strength due to the largely arbitrary way 
in which scores and weights are assigned. Local experts may use different criteria when ranking 
stringency, for example, while weighting of individual climate policies is almost entirely 
arbitrary. Other criticisms can also be made (see, for example, Surminski and Williamson, 2014). 
The aim of this article is to improve on these studies by devising a more meaningful and realistic 
index of climate policy strength. It opens by explaining the criteria used to identify six keynote 
climate policies for inclusion in this index. The following sections then use this index to compare 
the strength of climate policies in the six biggest emitters of CO2: China, the US, the EU, India, 
Russia, and Japan. Conclusions are then drawn.  
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2. METHOD  
The first step in constructing any climate policy index is to be clear about its purpose. The aim 
here is to compare the strength of climate policies across space and time. The strength dimension 
is defined in terms of the extent to which the statutory provisions of policies are likely to restrict 
greenhouse gas emissions if implemented as intended, as distinct from their actual effects on 
emissions. This is because good information on the effects of these policies net of other factors 
(such as economic conditions, investment climate, demography, quality of implementation, and 
the impact of other policies) is not available. 
For this approach to work there needs to be a strong positive correlation between the strength of 
policies included in the index and the strength of the entire range of climate policies that the 
index seeks to represent. This is the issue of validity and is a central problem because there is no 
means of determining with any certainty whether the strength of any subset of climate policies 
correlates highly with the full suite of climate policies in a single geographical unit, let alone 
several. Instead, like the authors of previous indices, we are obliged to make a number of 
rationally defensible assumptions about the relationship between the whole set and the subset. 
The first assumption is that the index should include policies which most experts believe can 
have a substantial standalone effect on emissions, such as emissions trading. This is because (a) 
such policies by themselves account for a significant portion of the emissions reductions caused 
by climate policies as a whole, and (b) it is reasonable to believe that governments which 
implement such policies are likely also to implement other climate policies in the same policy 
sector as well as the same type of climate policy in other sectors. One would expect, for example, 
stringent vehicle emissions standards to be correlated with both high motor-fuel taxes and 
stringent emissions standards for industry. 
The second assumption is that the extent to which the index reflects the wider range of climate 
policies increases with (a) the number of policy sectors covered, and (b) the number of policy 
types covered (taxes, standards etc.). For this reason it is desirable to include policies from most 
if not all relevant sectors as well as all major types of relevant policy instruments. 
The next step is to avoid aggregation. Scores for individual policies cannot be combined into a 
single summary score without giving each a weighting. The problem is that these weightings are 
essentially arbitrary because we don’t know how important each policy type is relative to all the 
others.  
The consequence of avoiding aggregation is that the result of applying the index is a profile of 
policies rather than a single summary score. To compare profiles as a whole requires keeping all 
the constituents in mind simultaneously. For this reason the number of items in the index should 
be limited to ten policy types at most.  
A further consideration is that the policies in the index should be applicable to all the countries 
for which comparisons are sought.  
Finally, for a policy to contribute usefully to the index it must be possible not only to specify the 
policy type (e.g. emissions standards) but also to measure its scope (e.g. carbon emissions for 
passenger road vehicles), settings (e.g. specific limits set), and geographical coverage. These 
considerations mean that the indicators need to be measures on which high quality information is 
available. 
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Table 1. Objectives  
Criterion Details 
Aim To construct an index of climate policy strength that has high validity and is easy 
to use to assess and compare climate policy strength around the world, defined as 
the logical potential of the statutory provisions of climate policies to restrict 
greenhouse gas emissions, other things being equal. 
Validity Index should be representative of the strength in any given geographical unit of 
climate policies as a whole. 
Component indicators to consist of policies that: 
1. Are relevant to all countries examined; 
2. Experts agree are effective in reducing emissions significantly when 
implemented with strong settings; 
3. Taken together cover most if not all major emitting sectors; 
4. Taken together include most if not all effective policy instruments. 
Ease of use 1. Fewer than ten policies in order for the resulting profiles to be easily 
comprehensible, thereby avoiding the need to aggregate numerical scores; 
not too time-consuming to apply; 
2. Composed of policies on which accurate up-to-date information is available 
for the geographical units covered. 
 
The policies included in our index are selected by applying the above criteria to the inventory of 
policy instruments recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2007, p. 750), as this is arguably the most authoritative list available. This results in the 
following portfolio. 
2.1 Carbon tax or emissions trading for the energy and manufacturing sectors 
There is general agreement among economists that putting a price on carbon is essential if 
progress is to be made in curbing carbon emissions. One approach is to create a fixed carbon 
price by imposing a carbon tax on fossil fuels, or on electricity produced from fossil fuels, that is 
higher than the cost of reducing emissions. Another is to introduce an emissions trading scheme 
(cap-and-trade) that establishes limits on emissions from targeted sources and requires each 
source to hold permits equal to its actual emissions or be fined, while allowing permits to be 
traded among emitters so that emissions reductions can be achieved where they are cheapest. 
Here the carbon price – the price of emissions permits – varies according to the pattern of supply 
and demand created by the size of the emissions cap relative to expected emissions. The strength 
of the incentive to reduce emissions depends on expected future permit prices being high relative 
to the cost of reducing emissions.  
What distinguishes carbon taxes as such is that they are assessed solely on the basis of carbon 
emissions. Taxes that are at least in part assessed on other criteria, such as taxes on motor fuel 
and the UK Climate Change Levy, are not included. While taxes on fossil fuel-based energy are 
also taxes on carbon emissions, the number and complexity of these means that aggregating and 
comparing them would be difficult if not impossible. 
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Once established, carbon taxes can be made more effective by broadening the emissions sources 
covered, raising rates, and removing exemptions. Emissions trading can be strengthened by  
lowering emissions caps and expanding the emissions sources and greenhouse gases covered. 
Both can be strengthened by widening their geographical coverage.  
Carbon taxes and emissions trading can be regarded as good indicators of climate policy because 
(1) they can potentially account for a substantial proportion of possible policy-induced emissions 
reductions, and (2) it is reasonable to expect that places with carbon taxes or emissions trading 
are relatively likely to have implemented other policies to reduce emissions in energy and 
manufacturing, as well as climate-related taxes and/or market-based instruments in other sectors. 
2.2 Feed-in tariffs and quotas for low carbon energy 
Although there are numerous ways of encouraging investment in low-carbon energy generation, 
most commentators favour feed-in tariffs or quota systems. Feed-in tariff schemes oblige 
electricity suppliers to purchase electricity produced by low-carbon generators at prices designed 
to be high enough to encourage investment in low-carbon energy. Quota schemes oblige 
suppliers to source a specified minimum percentage of their electricity from low-carbon 
generators or face penalties. Some schemes allow suppliers who have sourced more low carbon 
electricity than required to sell permits for this excess to suppliers who fail to meet their quotas. 
The general agreement in the literature is that feed-in tariffs are the more effective of the two 
instruments (Bürer, 2009; European Commission, 2008, p. 8). 
Feed-in tariffs and quotas can be applied to renewable energy, nuclear energy, and/or electricity 
produced by fossil-fuel power stations equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS). In 
general the wider the coverage of energy sources, the stronger the policies will be. High feed-in 
tariff rates relative to the cost of generating low carbon energy are more effective than low rates, 
as are high quotas that rise steeply over time and are accompanied by stringent fines for non-
compliance. The strength of both policies is affected by their geographical coverage. 
Feed-in tariffs and quotas can be regarded as good indicators of climate policy more generally 
because they are effective if well-designed (IPCC 2011, pp.25, 896-905), and imply the 
existence of other climate policies in the energy sector, and of market-based instruments in other 
sectors. 
2.3 Bans on fossil-fuel power stations without CCS, or emissions standards with equivalent 
effect 
Although phasing out fossil-fuel power stations without CCS might be accomplished solely 
through carbon pricing and incentives for low-carbon energy generation, the prospects of this 
happening are poor at present. An alternative is to ban conventional non-CCS fossil-fuel power 
stations or impose emissions standards that they cannot meet. This could start with an explicit or 
implicit ban on new coal power stations and progressively broaden in scope to other fossil fuels 
and to existing power plants until no conventional fossil fuel power stations are operating. Their 
actual impact on emissions would depend on the nature of existing plans for new fossil-fuel 
power stations and, ultimately, on the size of the existing fossil-fuel power sector. One might 
expect that authorities which use bans or emissions standards in this way are more likely also to 
have taken other steps to reduce energy sector emissions and to have imposed bans and/or 
emissions standards in other sectors. 
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2.4 Emissions standards and/or fuel-economy standards for motor vehicles 
Global CO2 emissions from transport grew by 49% between 1990 and 2011, led by emissions 
from the road sector, and now account for 22% of global CO2 emissions (IEA, 2013, pp. 11, 16). 
One approach to halting this trend is to impose or strengthen emissions standards and/or fuel-
economy standards for new motor vehicles (placing limits on fuel usage per kilometre also 
places limits on CO2 emissions) in order to encourage manufacturers to build more efficient and 
therefore less polluting cars. The impact on emissions of such standards will depend on how 
many new cars are sold and the extent to which they are enforced. It is reasonable to believe that 
authorities which have introduced such standards are relatively likely to implement other policies 
to reduce transport emissions and to apply emissions standards in other sectors. 
2.5 Is that all? 
A number of climate policies fail to meet the criteria for inclusion in our index. Targets and 
action plans are excluded because they describe aims rather than constituting policy instruments 
that act on the world.  Voluntary agreements, and information policies such as product labelling, 
are omitted because experts are divided about their effect on emissions (IPCC, 2014, ch15, pp. 
42-44). Public spending on low carbon energy research, development and deployment is 
excluded because such spending does not necessarily result in emissions reductions. Emissions 
in some sectors are insignificant compared to other sectors; consequently, policies to reduce 
emissions from waste are omitted (IPCC, 2014, ch5, p. 34). Financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries is excluded because by its nature this is a type of policy pursued by donor 
countries only. 
Some policies are omitted because good comparable data are not available. Official documents 
such as National Communications to the UNFCCC often omit details on policy mechanisms and 
settings in favour of outlining the aims of policies. They are also often outdated. Information 
gathered by organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), Climatico and the 
GLOBE study of climate legislation is often incomplete or lacks relevant details (IEA, 2014; 
Climatico, 2010; Nachmany et al, 2014). Where information is available, the policies described 
often vary over so many dimensions that meaningful comparison is impossible. As a result the 
Index does not include policies relating to emissions reductions in the building, forestry, 
agriculture or waste sectors. 
Table 2 summarises the policies chosen to constitute our Climate Policy Strength Index, along 
with their potential coverage and settings. Geographical coverage within a polity is a variable 
that applies to all the policies.  
The composition of this Index meets almost all the criteria summarised in Table 1. The policies 
included are widely regarded as effective in reducing emissions and could in principle be applied 
anywhere. Accurate and up-to-date information is usually available on their existence, coverage 
and settings. And restricting the Index to six policy types means, as we shall see, that the results 
of measuring their stringency can be understood as a whole without aggregating them into a 
summary score. 
  
7 
 
Table 2. The Climate Policy Strength Index 
Policy instrument Potential coverage of 
emissions sources 
Strong settings 
Emissions trading All or almost all energy 
generation and industry, 
plus air and sea transport 
Large annual reductions in 
emissions cap 
Carbon tax All or almost all energy 
generation, industry, 
transport 
High rate, no exemptions 
Feed-in tariffs  Renewables, nuclear, CCS; 
few if any restrictions 
High tariff level relative to 
costs 
Low carbon energy quota 
schemes 
Renewables, nuclear, CCS; 
few if any restrictions 
High quotas/large annual 
increases in quota size  
Ban on fossil fuel-fired power 
plants without CCS, or 
standards with equivalent effect 
Coal, gas, oil Ban or emissions standards 
that fossil fuel power plants 
without CCS cannot meet 
Emissions and/or fuel economy 
standards for motor vehicles 
All motor vehicles Low grammes of CO2 per 
kilometre  
 
 
3. RESULTS 
In this section the Index is applied to China, the US, the EU, India, Russia and Japan. Together 
these account for over 70% of global CO2 emissions: China emits 29%, the US 16%, the EU 
11%, India 6%, Russia 5%, and Japan 4% (Olivier et al, 2013, pp. 10-14, 17). The EU is 
analysed as a single unit because (a) many key elements of climate policy in Europe are adopted 
as common EU policies and (b) European countries are represented at climate negotiations by the 
EU. Information is taken mainly from official sources, data-oriented NGOs, and academic 
literature.  
3.1 Carbon tax 
Table 3 shows that so far carbon taxes are limited to Europe and Japan. 
In Europe carbon taxes were pioneered by Finland (1990), Norway (1991), Sweden (1991), and 
Denmark (1992). There was a setback when one introduced in Italy was abolished in 2002, but 
progress resumed when carbon taxes were introduced in Ireland (2010) and France (2013). The 
Carbon Price Floor introduced by the UK in 2013 counts as a carbon tax because it sets a 
minimum price for carbon. All these taxes cover a range of fossil fuels but often include 
significant exemptions and discounts. Rates vary markedly between countries and over time, and 
between fossil fuels within countries (Nachmany et al, 2014, p. 288; World Bank & Ecofys, 
2014, pp. 77-83). 
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Table 3. Carbon taxes 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
China - - - - 
US - - - - 
EU Denmark , 
Finland, 
Italy, 
Sweden 
Denmark , 
Finland, Sweden 
Denmark , Finland, 
Ireland, Sweden 
 
 
Denmark ($31/tCO2, 45% 
of emissions), Finland ($48, 
15%), France ($10, 35%), 
Ireland ($28, 40%), Sweden 
($168, 25%), UK ($16, 
25%)  
India - - - - 
Russia - - - - 
Japan - - - National ($2/tCO2, 70% of 
emissions) 
tCO2 = tonne of CO2 emitted. US dollars. Some rates relate to early 2014. 
Source: World Bank and Ecofys, 2014, pp. 32, 51-52.  
 
The Japanese carbon tax introduced in 2012 covers the use of all fossil fuels apart from in certain 
parts of the agriculture, transport, industry and electricity sectors. Its rate is currently about US$2 
per tonne of CO2 (tCO2) (Japan Ministry of Environment, 2012, 2012a; World Bank & Ecofys, 
2014, pp. 80-81).  
The stringency of carbon taxes can  be compared by comparing tax rates weighted by the 
percentage of total emissions covered. These can be calculated for each geographical unit by 
multiplying the rates listed in Table 3 by the percentage of emissions covered. This reveals a 
wide variety of average carbon prices, with Sweden way out in front and Japan bringing up the 
rear. Once the national rates for EU member states are weighted by each country’s emissions as a 
percentage of EU emissions, however (EEA, 2014, p. 13), it becomes clear that the effective 
rates for the EU and Japan are very similar:  EU   $1.8 
- Sweden  $42 
- Denmark $14 
- Ireland $11 
- Finland $7 
- UK $4 
- France $3.5  Japan   $1.4 
The ranking is therefore: 
Carbon taxes: EU/Japan 
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3.2 Emissions trading 
In addition to the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) there are schemes at 
subnational level in China, the US and Japan (Table 4). 
Table 4. Emissions trading schemes 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
China - - - Beijing ($9/tCO2, 50% of 
emissions), Shanghai ($5, 
50%), Tianjin ($6, 60%), 
Guangdong ($10, 42%), 
Hubei ($4, 35%), Shenzhen 
($11, 38%).  
US - - RGGI: 10 states: 
Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, 
Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont; 
energy only, 
undemanding 
caps 
RGGI 9 states (New Jersey 
left in 2011); energy only 
($3/tCO2, covers 20% of 
emissions) 
California ($13/tCO2, 35%) 
EU - EU ETS: energy 
and industry, 
undemanding 
caps 
EU ETS: energy 
and industry, 
undemanding 
caps 
EU ETS ($6/tCO2, 45% of 
emissions); energy, industry, 
aviation 
 
India - - - - 
Russia - - - - 
Japan - - Tokyo Tokyo, buildings ($76-
95/tCO2, 20% of emissions), 
Saitama, buildings (price not 
available, 16% of emissions) 
tCO2 = tonne of CO2 emitted. US dollars. Some prices relate to early 2014. 
Source: World Bank and Ecofys, 2014, pp. 32, 51-52.  
 
The EU ETS, which started operations in 2005, applies to installations in power and heat 
generation, energy-intensive industrial sectors, nitrous oxide production, and aviation. It covers 
about half of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. Widely fluctuating allowance prices indicate 
that so far most installations have been able to cover their emissions using only their initial 
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stocks of allowances: in 2013 allowance prices averaged around EUR 4/tCO2 emitted (about 
$5.60). The scheme was strengthened in 2013 when it was agreed to tackle the problem of too 
many allowances by holding back from auction 400 million allowances in 2014, 300 million in 
2015, and 200 million in 2016 (Europa, 2014; World Bank and Ecofys, 2014, pp. 54-56, 110). 
China plans to introduce a national emissions trading scheme later this decade, and launched 
pilot schemes in six major industrial regions in 2013. These apply mainly to energy, industry and 
buildings (World Bank and Ecofys, 2014, pp. 64-67). 
Although Republican opposition has so far thwarted attempts to introduce emissions trading in 
the US at federal level, by 2013 two subnational schemes had been established. The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) began operation in 2009 and covers emissions in nine states 
from fossil-fuel fired power plants of 25MW or above. The cap was cut by 45 per cent cut in 
2014 in response to the discovery that emissions from RGGI power plants were 27% lower than 
the cap. California established a scheme in 2013 (Environment North East, 2011; RGGI, 2014; 
California EPA, 2012; World Bank and Ecofys, 2014, pp. 57-58). 
Although a planned national emissions trading scheme in Japan lapsed in the legislature, 
mandatory schemes are in place in Tokyo and Saitama (World Bank and Ecofys, 2014, pp. 63-
64).  
The average carbon prices across all emissions of relevant geographical units (mainly 
subnational) that are created by emissions trading schemes can be obtained by multiplying the 
carbon prices given in Table 4 by the percentages of emissions covered. Again this results in a 
wide range of figures:  Tokyo  $19  California $4.6  Beijing  $4.5  Guangdong $4.2  Shenzhen $4.2  Tianjin  $3.6  EU  $2.7  Shanghai $2.5  Hubei  $1.4  RGGI  $0.6 
Average carbon prices across total CO2 emissions in China, the US, the EU, and Japan can be 
estimated by weighting the above carbon prices by the percentage of total emissions accounted 
for by the relevant geographical units in the US (2011), the EU and Japan (2010) and, in the 
absence of relevant emissions data, by the percentages of Chinese GDP accounted for by the 
relevant provinces (2012) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014; EPA, 2014a; Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government, 2013; Olivier et al, 2013, p. 16). This reveals that the carbon price 
attributable to emissions trading is highest in the EU, at $2.70/tCO2, compared with $0.90 for 
Japan, $0.83 for China, and just $0.34 in the US: 
Emissions trading: EU, Japan/China, US. 
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These figures are very low. The International Energy Agency argues that stabilising greenhouse 
gas emissions at 450 parts per million would require allowance prices of $50/tCO2 in 2020 and 
$110/tCO2 in 2030 (Hood 2010, pp. 17-18). 
3.3 Feed-in tariffs 
Feed-in tariffs are used more widely than either carbon taxes or emissions trading (Table 5).  
Table 5. Feed-in tariffs 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
China - Pilot schemes, 
some provinces 
National feed-in 
tariffs for wind 
and biomass  
National feed-in tariffs for 
wind, biomass and solar 
 
US - - California, 
Hawaii, Maine, 
Oregon, Vermont; 
limited scope 
California, Hawaii, Maine, 
Oregon, Vermont, Rhode 
Island; some renewables, 
caps on coverage 
EU 9 member 
states, most 
renewables 
 
18 member 
states, most 
renewables 
 20 member 
states, most 
renewables 
22 member states, national 
coverage: wind (22 member 
states, 4 caps), solar (18, 11), 
hydro including wave and 
tidal (20, 8, patchy coverage), 
geothermal (14, 3), biomass 
(21, 7), biogas (22, 7) 
India - 6 states, most 
renewables 
Mandatory for 
states, in place 14 
states, most 
renewables; 
national solar 
feed-in tariff  
Mandatory for states, in place 
18 states, all renewables; 
national solar feed-in tariff  
Russia - - - - 
Japan - - - National feed-in tariffs 
covering wind, solar, small 
hydro, geothermal, biomass 
and biogas 
Sources: see text. 2013: REN21, 2014, p. 82; RES Legal, 2014; US Department of Energy, 2013; 
Japan METI, 2014; IEA, 2014 (India); IREEED, 2014. 
See also REN21, 2014, p. 129. 
After a pilot phase from 2003, in 2009 the Chinese government required electricity grid 
companies to buy all electricity generated from renewable sources and set national feed-in tariff 
rates for onshore wind with four regional categories varying from EUR 0.052 per kilowatt hour 
(kWh) to EUR 0.062/kWh ($0.07-0.08/kWh). In 2010 a tariff rate for biomass was set at 
$0.11/kWh, and in 2011 a rate for solar energy was set at $0.08/kWh (IEA, 2014).  
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Although there is no federal feed-in tariff scheme in the US, by 2013 mandatory feed-in tariffs 
had been introduced in six states. Their scope is generally restricted to certain technologies 
(mainly solar), payment levels are generally low ($0.10-0.39/kWh for Hawaii, Maine, Oregon 
and Rhode Island), and coverage is often restricted to power plants below a certain size (REN21, 
2014, p. 129; US Department of Energy, 2014; US EIA, 2013a).  
In Europe the lack of an EU-level system is compensated for by the extension of national feed-in 
tariff schemes (including feed-in premiums) from nine member states in 2000 to 22 in 2013. 
These generally cover most renewable technologies, although eligibility for some is restricted to 
power plants below a certain size or by a cap on the amount of electricity covered. Tariff rates 
vary widely by country, technology, plant capacity and other factors but for Eurozone countries 
generally fall in the range EUR 0.05-0.30/kWh ($0.07-0.41/kWh) (REN21 2014, p. 129; RES 
Legal, 2014). 
National feed-in tariffs for solar, wind, geothermal, small-scale hydro, biomass and biogas were 
introduced in Japan in 2012. Rates varied between 13.65 and 57.75 yen/kWh ($0.13-0.57/kWh) 
depending on technology (Japan METI, 2014). 
In India feed-in tariffs were introduced first at state level. A national system was introduced in 
2006 when the central government required State Electricity Regulatory Commissions to 
establish preferential tariffs for electricity generated from renewable sources (IEA, 2014). In 
2009 the government issued binding guidelines on how feed-in tariff rates should be calculated 
(CERC, 2009). All renewable technologies are covered. The number of schemes operating in the 
28 states rose from zero in 2000 to 18 in 2013. Their scope differs from state to state but 
generally covers wind, solar, biomass, biogas and small hydro. State rates in 2014 were in the 
range 1.71-17.96 rupees (approximately $0.03-0.36) depending on factors such as state, 
technology, and plant size (REN21, 2014, p. 129; IREED, 2014). In 2010 national Power 
Purchase Tariffs were set at about $0.36/kWh for solar photovoltaic and $0.31 for solar thermal 
energy for a maximum of 10MW per state and 5MW per developer. Central rates for solar, wind, 
bagasse, biomass and hydro in 2014 were in the range 2.72-11.88 rupees ($0.05-0.24), depending 
on technology and plant size (IEA, 2014; Arora et al, 2010, p. 40; ICF, 2012, p. 70, IREED, 
2014).  
There is no easy way of comparing the strength of feed-in tariffs due to the complexity of many 
systems and the fact that nominal rates matter less than rates relative to production costs, for 
which good comparable data is not available.  
The comparison is therefore restricted  to coverage of renewable energy technologies, 
geographical coverage, and nominal tariff rates, so has to be regarded as tentative rather than 
conclusive. Judging by these criteria Japan’s scheme is the strongest, as it is Japan-wide, covers a 
broad range of technologies, and has the highest maximum and minimum tariff rates. Schemes in 
the EU and India also cover a broad range of technologies but have lower rates and are narrower 
in geographical scope. For these  reasons they must be considered roughly equivalent. Feed-in 
tariffs in China are weaker still because although they cover the entire country, rates are 
consistently low and only cover a limited range of technologies. US feed-in tariffs are the 
weakest because although rates are generally higher than in China, and coverage of renewables is 
similar, they only exist in six of the 50 states. There are no feed-in tariffs in Russia.   
Feed-in tariffs: Japan, EU/India, China, US 
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3.4 Quota schemes 
Schemes setting quotas for renewable energy for electricity suppliers exist in the US, Europe, 
and India (Table 6). 
Table 6. Quota systems 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
China - - - - 
US 12 states, 
most 
renewables 
20 states, 
most 
renewables 
31 states, most 
renewables 
29 states + Washington DC; most renewables; 
quotas by target year:  
2015: Montana 15%, Wisconsin 10%, Michigan 
10%, New York 29%, Texas 5,880MW;  
2017: Maine 40% 
2020: Washington 15%, California 33%, 
Colorado 30%, Kansas 20%, New Mexico 20%, 
Massachusetts 22.1%, Rhode Island 16%, 
Connecticut 27%, Washington DC 20% 
2021: Missouri 15%, North Carolina 12.5%, 
Pennsylvania 18%, New Jersey 20.38% 
2022: Maryland 20% 
2024: Ohio 12.5% 
2025: Minnesota 25%, Illinois 25%, New 
Hampshire 24.8%, Oregon 25%, Nevada 25%, 
Arizona 15% 
2026: Delaware 25% 
2030: Hawaii 40% 
No date: Iowa 105MW    
EU Italy only, 
most 
renewables 
5 countries, 
most 
renewables 
6 countries, 
most 
renewables 
6 countries, all renewables: Belgium (various 
quota sizes), Italy (7.55%), Poland (12%), 
Romania (14%), Sweden (0.135/MWh), UK 
(0.206 certificates/MWh) 
India - 6 states, 
most 
renewables 
National, most 
renewables, 
implemented 
by 18 states; 
actual quotas 
vary by state 
National (8%), most renewables; actual quotas 
vary by state 
Russia - - - - 
Japan - National, 
most 
renewables 
National, most 
renewables 
(replaced by feed-in tariff 2012) 
Sources: see text. 2013: US Department of Energy, 2014; RES Legal, 2014; IEA, 2014 (India); IREEED, 
2014.  
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Despite the absence of a national-level quota system in the US, state-level schemes have spread 
from 12 states in 2000 to 29 in 2013. Most cover a broad range of technologies, but quota sizes 
vary widely (REN21, 2014, p. 82; US Department of Energy, 2014).  
Quota schemes are less popular in Europe: by 2013 just six countries were involved (REN21, 
2014, p. 130; RES Legal, 2014).  
In India, quotas were pioneered by Maharashtra in 2003. A national-level quota system was 
introduced in 2006 when State Electricity Regulatory Commissions were required to establish 
quotas for wind, solar and biomass. In 2011 national minimum quotas for solar energy were 
established and are set to increase gradually from 0.25% in 2012 to 3% by 2022. A further 
development in 2011 was the introduction of tradable certificates to strengthen incentives and 
help states meet their quotas (REN, 2014, p. 130; MNRE, 2014; Arora, 2010, p. 25). By 2013 the 
federal target for Indian states for renewables in general was 8%. Information for 2014 shows 
that state solar quotas were in the range 0.1-1.5%, while non-solar quotas were in the range 0.6-
10% (IEA, 2014; IREEED, 2014). 
Quotas for wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and biomass were introduced in Japan in 2003 but 
replaced by feed-in tariffs in 2012 (Japan METI, 2014; IEA, 2014).  
The strength of quota policies is difficult to compare due to their complexity and their diversity 
within polities, but it is possible to make a distinction between the US and India, on the one 
hand, and the EU on the other. The US and India are roughly equivalent in that US quota levels 
are relatively high but apply to only 29 of the 50 states, while coverage in India is national but 
quota levels are low. The range of renewables covered is similar. The narrower geographical 
coverage of quota systems in Europe means that the EU lags behind on this policy.  
Quotas: US/India, EU 
3.5 Effective bans on fossil fuel power stations 
The only effective bans on fossil fuel-fired power stations in 2013 related almost exclusively to 
new coal-fired power stations (Table 7). 
Table 7. Bans on fossil fuel-fired power stations or emissions standards with equivalent effect 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
China - - - Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, 
Yangtze River Delta, Pearl 
River Delta 
US Oregon Oregon California, 
Montana, Oregon, 
Washington 
California, Montana, New 
York, Oregon, Washington 
EU - - - UK 
India - - - - 
Russia - - - - 
Japan - - - - 
Sources: State Council, 2013; C2ES, 2014; DECC, 2014 
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By 2013 emissions performance standards (EPCs) for coal-fired power stations stringent enough 
to preclude the operation of new coal power plants without CCS were in place in five American 
states. The standards for California, Oregon and Washington were set at 1,100 pounds of CO2 
per megawatt hour (lb/MWh), and 925 lb/MWh for New York. Montana requires that new plants 
capture and store at least 50% of their emissions (C2ES, 2014; Rubin, 2009, p. 8). Similar 
standards were planned at federal level but were not yet in operation (EPA, 2014).  
An EPC for new coal-fired power stations of 450g/kWh (992 lb/MWh) was introduced in the UK  
in 2013 (DECC, 2014).   
Another development in 2013 was the introduction by the Chinese government of a ban on the 
approval of new coal-fired power stations in three major industrial regions, China having begun 
to close down small inefficient thermal power stations in 2008 (State Council, 2013; Yang and 
Cui 2013; ICF, 2012, pp. 48-49). 
All these measures focus exclusively on new coal-fired power stations apart from the Chinese 
programme. However the shares of GDP covered are rather different: 15% for the EU, 25% for 
the US, and 43% for China, although it should be noted that the Chinese figure is inflated by the 
fact that the relevant regions do not cover all of the provinces in which they are located and for 
which GDP figures have been collected (Eurostat, 2014; US Department of Commerce, 2014; 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014).  
Effective bans on fossil fuel-fired power plants: China, US, EU 
3.6 Emissions standards for road passenger vehicles  
Fuel economy standards were introduced in the US following  the 1973 oil crisis (Table 8). In 
2010 it was announced that they would be merged with new carbon emissions standards. Japan’s 
fuel efficiency standards also have a long history. The EU started with voluntary standards 
agreed with vehicle manufacturers before moving to a mandatory system in 2009 when 
manufacturers failed to achieve these voluntary targets. In China, fuel economy standards were 
introduced in 2005 (An Feng, 2011, pp. 5-10; Dieselnet, 2009; ICCT, 2012, 2014a).  
 
Table 8. Passenger vehicle emissions standards (gCO2/km) 
 2000 2005 2010 2013 
China - 213 180 161 (2015) 
US 226 215 190 171 (2016) 
EU (172, 
voluntary) 
(161, voluntary) (140, voluntary) 130 (2015) 
India - - - - 
Russia - - - - 
Japan 169 153 128 125 (2015) 
Sources: see text. 2013: ICCT, 2014a, 2014b; Transport.net, 2014. 
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As small differences between emissions standards are unlikely to be significant in terms of 
emissions, the most meaningful distinction is between the more stringent standards of the EU 
and Japan and the less stringent standards of China and the US: 
Passenger vehicle emissions standards: EU/Japan; China/US 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The 2013 rankings on the six policies that comprise  the Climate Policy Strength Index are 
summarised below: 
Carbon taxes:    EU/Japan  
Emissions trading:   EU; Japan/China; US. 
Feed-in tariffs:   Japan; EU/India; China; US 
Quotas:    US/India; EU 
Fossil fuel power plant bans:  China; US; EU 
Vehicle emissions standards:  EU/Japan; China/US 
 An idea of the pressure exerted by carbon pricing on firms to reduce their emissions can be 
obtained by combining the carbon prices created by carbon taxes and emissions trading.  This 
reveals that the EU has the highest carbon price, followed by Japan, the US and China. (Table 9).  
Table 9. Carbon price signal strength 
Emitter Carbon 
price 
($US) 
Emissions 
(MtCO2e) 
2011 
Percent coverage 
of national 
emissions 
Emissions 
covered 
(MtCO2) 
Strength index 
(price times 
percent 
coverage) 
China 3.26 9,700 7.2                700.0             0.23 
US 10.15 5,420 10.8 588.1 1.10 
California 14.00   450.9  
RGGI 3.40   137.2  
EU 5.94 3,790 50.0            1895.0  2.97 
Japan 2.89 1,240 90.0            1,116.0  2.60 
India - 1,970 - - - 
Russia - 1,830 - - - 
CO2 emissions: EDGAR 2014. 
Carbon price: China: estimated rate of 20 yuan for combined emissions trading and carbon tax 
2016 (Jotzo et al., 2013, p. 17). US: aggregate of California and RGGI. US rate is weighted price 
by emissions price and coverage for the two schemes (Point Carbon, 2013, p. 2). EU: European 
Carbon Exchange in Tindale, 2012, p. 2. Japan: Japan Ministry of Environment, 2012, 2012a; 
ACC, 2012. 
Coverage: IETA 2013; California EPA ARB, 2014, p.2; Environment North East, 2011, p.1; 
IETA, 2014, p. 2; Lee et al, 2012, p.2.  
EU strength index relates to emissions trading only.  
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Indirect support for the feed-in tariff and quota rankings comes from the fact that the places with 
the longest records of these policies, the EU and US, have the highest proportions of renewable 
energy technologies that require state support to expand (Table 10). 
Table 10. Renewable energy 
Emitter Wind + biomass/waste + solar All renewable technologies 
Terawatt hours % total energy Terawatt hours % total energy 
China 110 2.47 797 17.88 
US 178 3.15 520 9.20 
EU 296 5.37 699 12.70 
Japan 31 2.53 116 9.41 
India 31 2.79 162 14.58 
Russia 3 0.30 166 17.83 
Sources: European Commission, 2012 for EU, otherwise US EIA, 2013. Figures are for 2011 
apart from EU and Russia, for which they are for 2010. 
The main finding is that, contrary to expectations, Europe is not the clear frontrunner on climate 
policy stringency: the EU does lead on a number of policies but so does Japan. China, the US, 
and India each lead on one area.  Russia is the only clear laggard.  
Although there is a trend towards stronger policies in all areas over time, climate policies 
everywhere remain weak compared to the potential settings listed in Table 2. Emissions trading 
caps are high, for instance, and the reach of feed-in tariffs and quotas is often restricted.  
What then is the overall ranking on climate policy? The temptation to produce one is almost 
overwhelming but has to be resisted because there is no way of combining the six rankings 
without making arbitrary judgments on the relative importance of each type of climate policy. It 
is this set of six rankings itself that is the most meaningful summary indicator of the relative 
strength of climate policies. While in common with previous indices there are questions over 
how representative the policies chosen for the index are of climate policy in general, unlike these 
other indices  the Climate Policy Strength Index does not import further sources of error in the 
form of largely arbitrary numerical scorings and weightings.  
One important caveat is that the rankings do not take account of the extent to which the policies 
concerned are implemented as intended, as the information needed to assess this is too patchy. It 
is also important to stress the need for frequent updating of the Index.  If the planned national 
emissions trading scheme is implemented in China, for example, the rankings will change.  
The few systematic international comparisons of climate policy strength made so far have 
serious weaknesses. The Climate Policy Strength Index is designed to avoid these by producing a 
set of rankings of emitters on key policy types. The policy significance of this is that it enables 
climate policy strength to be compared more realistically across space and time. As such its 
availability should facilitate international negotiations by giving participants a better idea of 
where each emitter stands relative to the others on climate policy stringency, and by clearly 
identifying policy types on which each emitter is relatively weak.  
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